Atlanta Braves President of Baseball Operations John Hart vs. the Critics
How can you do a job evaluation when the results might require 3, 4, perhaps even 7 to 10 years to completely play out?
That is ultimately the dilemma in trying to assess the tasks that new Atlanta Braves President of Baseball Operations, John Hart, has set himself to so far this Fall and early Winter.
But there are conventional ways in which General Managers go about their business – and some unconventional tactics as well. Ken Rosenthal has been hearing some noise that there are several who don’t quite get what Hart is trying to put together in Atlanta.
"“I love John Hart, but I don’t like his offseason.”"
In a nutshell, that is the quote anchoring Rosenthal’s piece from this last weekend that openly questioned the Atlanta Rebuild (yes, let’s call this what it is). The entire premise of his evaluation, derived from the mutterings from multiple baseball executives, comes down to a single word:
Risk.
The Actuarial Approach
Actuaries make it their business to evaluate risk. They are probably most associated with the insurance industry, as it is their job to evaluate – on average – how risky it may be to insure a client having a given set of conditions that could result in their company having to pay off a policy before it expires. Based on those evaluations, policy rates are set.
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It is a system whose payoff cannot be known in the short term: it is only after multiple years – decades, even – that profit can be realized.
Or a business failure… in the case of poor evaluations.
John Hart seems to be making a case for an approach that has never before been tried in major league baseball. He is effectively telling his trading partners ‘Give me your broken-down young studs and I will see what I can do with them.’
Let’s count up the risk conditions that have been brought in so far:
- Nick Markakis. Neck surgery in December. Full recovery expected, but could be a little late getting started this season.
- Max Fried. August 2014 TJ surgery. The headline lefty coming back in the Justin Upton trade. Will not pitch for the next full year. But as Rosenthal pointed out, “he was less than dominant even before he got hurt while pitching in the Midwest League in 2013”.
- Tyrell Jenkins. Returning from latissimus muscle repair surgery (Aug 2013). Part of the Heyward/Walden/Miller trade.
- Michael Kohn. April 2012 TJ surgery. Minor league free agent signing.
- Daniel Winkler. August 2014 TJ. The Rule 5 draft pick will miss all of 2015.
- Aaron Kurcz. July 2012 TJ. Traded for Anthony Varvaro.
- Arodys Vizcaino. Here’s a case in which the Cubs thought they might be able to win the risk game – taking Vizzy from the Braves shortly after his 2012 TJ surgery. However, that didn’t work as they had planned – including the need for a cleanup procedure in May 2013. So now he’s back with Atlanta.
- Manny Banuelos. October 2012 TJ surgery. Just picked up from the Yankees in the Shreve/Carpenter trade.
This isn’t the first time we’ve pointed out the list of infirmary cases. But clearly, some of these are not like the others: Fried and Winkler are out for all of 2015. Markakis and Vizcaino should be back and contributing strongly this season. Jenkins is close – if he gets a full healthy season, then he may be ready for the majors. The rest should be back to full strength this season.
The Bigger Names
Rosenthal highlighted Fried and Markakis as large concerns in his piece. Markakis because of the extended contract at a time the Braves knew of the need for surgery; Fried because he was the “prize” of the Upton deal.
In particular, there seems to be some surprise in baseball circles that the Braves didn’t – or couldn’t – pry away a healthier Padres top prospect. RHP Matt Wisler, catcher Austin Hedges, and OF Hunter Renfroe were named in particular.
Max Fried (photo credit: Bill Mitchell, via baseballamerica.com)
For part of this the Braves undoubtedly leaned toward new GM Advisor Chad MacDonald for guidance – he being the Padres AGM for 3 years until August 2014. We don’t have insight into whether those other players were discussed, offered, rejected, or whatever. But we should expect that our own “insider” would have approved of the package Atlanta got back. If MacDonald did not believe in the promise of Max Fried, then surely Hart would have gone in a different direction.
But once again: only time will tell for Fried.
As for Markakis, there’s a number of factors that likely led in this direction. Certainly there were those in the Orioles organization that really hated to see him depart – center fielder Adam Jones in particular.
Personally, while the news of the neck problem caused an initial ‘uh oh’ reaction, this should be a short-term concern with a longer-term benefit to the player and the team – correcting an issue that had been lingering for 2 seasons. Thus, I believe the surgery was a far overblown concern – one that should be forgotten by mid-season.
Aside from that, Hart had several reasons for targeting Markakis:
- Best available option on the free agent market for right field. Period.
- By all accounts, a great clubhouse presence.
- Consistent performance
- Excellent price. After a $2 million signing bonus, he gets “just” $10.5 million per year through 2018, a bit less than expected for him.
- No loss of prospects as he seeks to reload the farm
The New Billy Beane?
Oakland’s GM Billy Beane has made a career with two driving philosophies:
- Sell high/Buy low
- For position players: high OBP. For pitchers: low OBP allowed.
So that’s seven pitchers picked up this off-season. All of them constitute “buy low” opportunities. Some (Winkler, Kohn, Jenkins) could be thought of as “no risk” as well.
Of that entire group, truly only one – Max Fried – is the real risk, for he was the main centerpiece of the return that Atlanta received for Justin Upton. Manny Banuelos is second on that ‘risk list’ given what was lost to the Yankees, but he’s already fully recovered from his surgery, and just needs mound time to (hopefully) demonstrate the form he had as an ‘untouchable’ prospect.
So yes – this is a lot like a Billy Beane-style off-season: Selling high on assets with a limited shelf-life; buying low on high-upside prospects with dings and dents. Meanwhile, there’s also the fact that the Braves are shedding strikeouts and bringing in multiple “contact hitters” – most with decent OBP skills (and a hitting coach to match).
The element Hart is adding to the Beane philosophy is this: we won’t mind rehabbing your pitchers if we can get ’em cheap. I don’t know if this was the plan going in. It may have developed over time after Hart found that he could not get the volume/quality of players expected. But from this ‘Actuary’ point of view, it does make some sense.
High risk, sure. But if even two or three or the seven pan out, it is a plan that could pay large dividends down the road.
Is Hart trying to do too much at once?
This question has been my concern over the past month or so. In the midst of the wheeling and dealing, there are multiple agendas being played:
- Add as many high-end prospects as possible
- Reduce costs
- Change the offensive philosophy – fewer K’s; more OBP
- Build through the farm and through quality pitching
The one glaring omission is this: fielding an offensively competitive team. You can argue – as Hart himself did – that the club he inherited wasn’t exactly the 1927 Yankees. The 2014 Braves were 29th in run scoring. Next to last.
Thus even with no improvement, I could argue that can’t get hurt if you fall onto the floor from a sitting position. Still, Braves fans want more. They are used to having more. If Chris Johnson and Andrelton Simmons manage to bounce back, then they might see a little improvement in 2015. With solid pitching, that might even be relatively competitive.
The real answers, though, are still some time away.