And it’s a shame that, even with historically great seasons, players like Craig Kimbrel, Aroldis Chapman, and Fernando Rodney, will receive almost no lasting recognition for their achievements. Kimbrel and Chapman had some of the most dominant seasons ever with their ridiculous K%, and Rodney had a record-setting 0.60 ERA.  Nevertheless, none of them will receive any bit of hardware to go down in the record-books. What’s worse is that each of the players could do it again and again for years to come, and still, they would never be a serious part of any award discussion. Mariano Rivera had 15 years of greatness and never won the CYA, and only even gotten a first place vote twice. And if he couldn’t do it in NY and as perhaps the greatest reliever, it’s hard to imagine anyone else doing it.

It’s not like the Cy Young Award is an objective measurement of how valuable a pitcher is to his team. It could be, and a lot of times it is. But the importance of the award lies in subjective memory that it creates around a player’s name. His award history tells a story about a player, how good he was, and what the fans and media thought about him. Beyond that, award voting creates heated argument about players that are both very fun to have and help us remember how good they were in particular years. Ultimately, it helps in evaluating a player’s candidacy for the Hall of Fame.

It seems sort of absurd to exclude such an important role from awards voting. The best hitters get the MVP, Hank Aaron, Silver Slugger, etc. The best starters get the Cy Young. The best fielders get the Gold Glove. Currently, relievers are the ONLY role in baseball for which the BBWAA doesn’t vote for an award. Greatness in any role should be rewarded – I don’t see a reason why relievers shouldbe left out. The award that exists now, the Rolaids Relief Man Award, is seriously flawed. For one, no one pays attention to it. There isvery little publicity behind the award, and the results not only fly under the radar, but are buried underground. Moreover, the Rolaids Award calculates a winner from a mathematical formula, functionally removing all discussion and argument from the process and making the award as boring as it can possibly be. There was no point talking about Kimbrel vs. Chapman for the award because the winner was already determined. Lastly, the stats used are extremely flawed. Rolaids places a heavy weight on the number of saves that a closer gets. Saves are a horrible evaluative tool for relievers, which is an argument I’m sure you’ve read about somewhere. Save totals are capped at the amount at the amount of save opportunities that your team has. That means teams that win regularly in blowouts or lose a lot will give their closers less of an opportunity to accumulate saves. Moreover, saves sometimes aren’t high enough of a standard. A closer that comes in with a 3 run lead in the 9^th inning has a win expectancy of over 95%. Despite that, he could give up 3 walks and 2 runs, still get the save, and help him win the award. The emphasis on saves also brackets out all non-closers from the discussion. The best reliever in the league doesn’t have to be the guy who comes out in the 9^th inning – the guy who led the league in Shutdowns in 2011 was Jonny Venters.

If there was a reliever of the year award, the NL discussion would certainly center around Kimbrel and Chapman. But Kimbrel would win, because his numbers were better across the board

The main reason for this, of course, was the rise in strike outs. He struck out an astonishing 16.66 batter per 9 innings and struck out 50.2% of all batters he faced. That equates to nearly two batters per inning (1.856) over the course of the entire season.  This is stuff that literally no one else has done before – no one else in the history of the game (who’s pitched 30+ innings) has even broken a 45% K rate.

The nastiness started with his fastball, whose velocity was up a tick to 97.6 mph from 96.92 mph last year. That speed was accompanied by some solid upward  and armside run, according to Pitch F/X. He threw it about 2/3 of the time and used it primarily early in the count and to catch up when he was behind. Throwing it for strikes over 63% of the time, he was able to utilize it very effectively when he needed it. The nastiness finished with his curveball, which was faster than most curveballs, averaging 86.46 mph, and bit severely downward and gloveside at the last second.  He used it primary when he was ahead in the count and induced whiffs over half the times it was swung at.

Besides strike-ing out everyone and their mothers, he was able to prevent runners from getting on base. He finished the season with a microscopic .654 WHIP. This was partially because of a strong improvement in command – he only issued 14 walks the whole season, good for a real solid 6.1%.  Furthermore, he induced groundballs just about half the time, helping him limit his babip to .250. He was relatively capable of keeping the ball in the park. He was hurt somewhat by his high 9.7 HR/FB ratio, but since he dropped his FB rate to 31.6%, homeruns weren’t too much of a factor (even if we all remember them because they were in the 9^th inning).

Kimbrel has certainly had a season for the ages. The Braves only paid little more than half a million for him last year. And he’s still a year away from arbitration eligibility, so we will have him on the cheap again next year.  I find it hard to believe that Kimbrel will keep up the same pace again next year. Its extremely hard to maintain such dominance. Provided he stays healthy, I would expect Kimbrel to still have a very strong year perhaps on par with his 2011 rookie year. Of course, relievers (besides Mariano Rivera) are nigh impossible to predict. Jonny Venters is a good example of this. If closer history tells us anything, even 3 years down the road, Kimbrel could only be a shadow of his 2012 self. However, for next year, there is nothing to indicate that he will drop off very much, and I’m pretty excited to watch him pitch again.

His fastball/breaking ball combination is probably as lethal as any in history.  His average velocity has risen to nearly 97 MPH, while his breaking ball is averaging nearly 86 MPH with good curveball movement.

His fastball has about 3-4 less inches of “life” of a normal fastball of this velocity.  Hitters swing at it about 52% of the time, which is about league average, but only make contact about two-thirds of the time, well below the 85-90% average.  It is the pitch hit harder, allowing 21% line drives and only about 33% groundballs, while all three homers have come off the fastball.

The breaking ball is in a class of its own.  Hitters swing at it about 43% of the time, swinging more often on pitches out of the zone than in it.  It’s also impossible to hit out of the zone, making contact on about 35% of such pitches and 49% overall.  Amazingly, those contact numbers are actually up a bit from last year.  When they do make contact, the ball doesn’t go anywhere, allowing an 11% line drive rate and 85% groundballs.

It doesn’t take much to realize that someone is special when they have a 0.80 FIP and 0.79 xFIP into September.  It’s always nice to close out a game the same way this post ends.

September 14, 2012; Atlanta, GA, USA; Mandatory Credit: Daniel Shirey-US PRESSWIRE