Atlanta Braves Trade of Kimbrel/Upton: Full Financial Impact

More from Tomahawk Take

Back in January, I explored the case for trading Craig Kimbrel. Of the arguments made at the time, the one scenario I opted not to delve into was the one that actually came up in real life: that some team would weigh the costs and come up with an acceptable formula that included taking Melvin Upton as part of the deal.

Of all the stunning aspects of this trade, that’s close to the top: with willing ownerships and money being thrown around like rice at a wedding, it’s become very clear that baseball executives are in a world that most of us are unfamiliar with.

I won’t deal with the San Diego side of that equation: they made a value judgment that I cannot justify… then again, they have been doing that a lot lately. But if you can manage to separate yourself from the loss of the players, there are real aspects of the Braves part of this that make great fiscal sense.

Numbers Game

You have probably heard the bottom line numbers involved, but here’s where they come from:

Kimbrel: $9 million in 2015, $11m/$13m/$1m buyout in 2018. The 2018 option is for $13 million if the Padres want to take it. $34 million minimum obligation.
Upton: $14.45 million in ’15, $15.45m/$16.45m through 2017. $46.35 million total obligation.
Thus San Diego takes on $80.35 million.

On the other side:

Cameron Maybin: $7m in 2015, $8m in 2016, $1m buyout of $9m option in 2017. $16 million minimum obligation. It’s also done after 2016.
Carlos Quentin: $8m in 2015. He has a mutual option clause for 2016 with a $3 million buyout clause that appears to have a vesting requirement before kicking in. I will assume that the buyout is $0 since that requirement is unattainable. Others agree with this. Of note is that his contract included a no-trade clause, but reports are that he asked for nothing to break that. He will never be fitted for a Braves’ jersey as he’s been DFA’d. Total obligation: $8 million.
Thus Atlanta takes on $24 million in the deal.

$80.35 million minus $24 million means that Atlanta has a net benefit of $56.35 million. Other reports I have seen suggest that Quentin will get that buyout, and thus the number becomes $53.35 million. Whatever. I believe the higher figure is correct.

Avoiding a Balloon Payment

It is fair to argue as well, that Atlanta not only was bailed out by including Melvin Upton in this trade, but that they avoided a big financial money pit coming up.

In 2014, the team ate $20 million of Dan Uggla’s contract. If Upton showed little or no performance gains in 2015 – his performance so far has been zero due to injury – then it is possible that the Braves would have had to bite off an even larger chunk of cash within the next year or two, which would have continued to financially burden the club.

At this point, the replacement cost was minimal: Eric Young Jr. and Eury Perez were hired as “just in case” players for 2015. But the issue was only going to grow larger with each passing day.

But now? That’s all done. The ‘sunk cost’ has been paid off in full… albeit at the cost of the best closer in the game.

2015 Impact

Subtracting the sum of Kimbrel/Upton salaries ($23.45 million) while adding Maybin/Quentin ($15 million) means a net savings for this year alone of $8.45 million.

Overall, this brought the Opening Day payroll figure to approximately $96.869 million. This counts things like Dan Uggla‘s salary (although he was actually paid off in 2014), plus James Russell‘s release monies and the 5 players on the DL.

Future Impact

Atlanta has dramatically altered their landscape going forward. Prior to January, I was estimating future payroll obligations that would escalate up to $84 million in 2017… just due to players already under contract at that time.

As of this moment, those future obligations look like this:

2016: $52.4 million (was $66.25m)
2017: $57.1 million (was $84.25m)
2018: $53.3 million (Simmons, Freeman, Markakis, Teheran)
2019: $45.2 million (Simmons, Freeman, Teheran)
2020: $38.0 million (Simmons, Freeman)

Much more manageable for a club able to operate in the $100-$120 million payroll range.

You could also argue that with all the “kids” coming up, these numbers need not rise that much either. For every Mike Minor you eventually allow to walk away ($5.6 million salary in 2015), you add a Mike Foltynewicz or Matt Wisler at the major league minimum. For every Chris Johnson, there’s a Rio Ruiz.

The Braves now have a ton of payroll space for 2016 and beyond to target specific free agents to fill in gaps where needed, which – if you follow this chart – can be expected in the outfield, though Right Field itself is covered at a reasonable price through 2018.

Player Impacts

While we’re here, I will also mention a couple of future positional considerations:

We have anticipated that Shae Simmons would be Kimbrel’s “heir apparent” in the closers role. Craig’s departure, coupled with Simmons’ TJ surgery means that there is a gap. Fortunately, Jason Grilli and Jim Johnson are already in the house to bridge that gap somewhat. Hopefully Simmons will be able to return early next season and grow into that role.
Mallex Smith was acquired in the first Upton trade – Justin’s. The way is now clear for him to have the Center Field spot whenever he is deemed ready for the task, which could be as early as some point in 2016 (more likely 2017).

The Finale

John Hart can continue to say the right things about not wanting to trade Kimbrel, but at the end of the day, the numbers spoke loudly to him. The impact to 2015 is minimum on the field is probably not going to be significant, but the impact for the next several years should be dramatic.

With this deal – and the rest from this off-season – Hart has given the Braves a chance at success for the next decade.

The tear-down is thus likely done: it’s now time to see how things rebuild from here.

Next: Fans Stay Fans

Home/Braves News